Welcome! I'm a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Economics at The Pennsylvania State University. My primary research interest is Applied Theory with a focus on Organizational Economics and Political Economy.
I will be available for interviews at EJME 2022 and ASSA 2023.
You can find my CV here.
The Art of Waiting [Job Market Paper] (with Vasundhara Mallick)
Abstract: This paper studies delegated project choice without commitment: a principal and an agent have conflicting preferences over which project to implement, and the agent is privately informed about the availability of projects. We consider a dynamic setting in which, until a project is selected, the agent can propose a project, and the principal can accept or reject the proposed project. Importantly, the principal cannot commit to his responses. In this setting, the agent has an incentive to hold back on proposing projects that the principal favors so that the principal approves a project favored by the agent. Nevertheless, the principal achieves his commitment payoff in an equilibrium of the game in the frequent-offer limit. This high payoff equilibrium showcases the art of waiting and contrasts with Coasian logic: by giving proposer power to the agent, the principal makes it credible to reject his dispreferred projects until later in the game giving the agent an incentive to propose principal-preferred projects earlier on. We apply these results to the economics of organization and merger analysis. In particular, these results suggest a pure strategic gain from giving workers the initiative to pursue their desired projects, and to solicit their ideas "bottom-up" rather than issuing "top-down" commands.
Abstract: I consider an agenda setting environment where the voters commit upfront to the reforms they are willing to pass, and the agenda setter chooses from among the passable reforms or the status quo. I first characterize the outcomes that emerge in subgame perfect equilibria of this game with majoritarian voting rules. Motivated by the weak predictive power of subgame perfection for this game, I consider a refinement to account for the possibility of coalitional deviations. Compared to the predictions of standard models, the agenda setter's power is significantly reduced in this game, especially in the presence of coalitions and with simple majority rule.