

# Ece Teoman

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## EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics	The Pennsylvania State University	2017-2023 (expected)
M.A. in Economics	Bilkent University	2015-2017
B.A. in Economics	Bilkent University	2010-2015

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## ACADEMIC RESEARCH

INTERESTS: Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Organizational Economics, Industrial Organization

ADVISOR: S. Nageeb Ali

RESEARCH PAPERS:

***The Art of Waiting (Job Market Paper) (with Vasundhara Mallick)***

*Abstract:* This paper studies delegated project choice without commitment: a principal and an agent have conflicting preferences over which project to implement, and the agent is privately informed about the availability of projects. We consider a dynamic setting in which, until a project is selected, the agent can propose a project, and the principal can accept or reject the proposed project. Importantly, the principal cannot commit to his responses. In this setting, the agent has an incentive to hold back on proposing projects that the principal favors so that the principal approves a project favored by the agent. Nevertheless, the principal achieves his commitment payoff in an equilibrium of the game in the frequent-offer limit. This high payoff equilibrium showcases the art of waiting and contrasts with Coasian logic: by giving proposer power to the agent, the principal makes it credible to reject his dispreferred projects until later in the game giving the agent an incentive to propose principal-preferred projects earlier on. We apply these results to the economics of organization and merger analysis. In particular, these results suggest a pure strategic gain from giving workers the initiative to pursue their desired projects, and to solicit their ideas “bottom-up” rather than issuing “top-down” commands.

***Agenda-Setting with Legislative Precommitments***

*Abstract:* I consider an agenda setting environment where the voters commit upfront to the reforms they are willing to pass, and the agenda setter chooses from among the passable reforms or the status quo. I first characterize the outcomes that emerge in subgame perfect equilibria of this game with majoritarian voting rules. Motivated by the weak predictive power of subgame perfection for this game, I consider a refinement to account for the possibility of coalitional deviations. Compared to the predictions of standard models, the agenda setter’s power is significantly reduced in this game, especially in the presence of coalitions and with simple majority rule.

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## CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

Women in Economic Theory	2022
Midwest Economic Theory Conference	2022
17th European Meeting on Game Theory (SING17)	2022
23rd ACM Conference on Economics & Computation (EC’22) (Poster)	2022
Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (Poster)	2021, 2022
Penn State Theory and Women’s Workshops	2019-2022

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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Instructor, Math Camp for MA Program, <i>Penn State</i>	2021
Instructor, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis and Policy, <i>Penn State (World Campus)</i>	Summer 2020
Teaching Assistant, Graduate Micro Theory; Graduate Game Theory, <i>Penn State</i>	2020-2021
Teaching Assistant, Microeconomic Analysis; Game Theory; Behavioral Economics, <i>Penn State</i>	2017-2022
Teaching Assistant, Graduate Micro Theory, <i>Bilkent University</i>	2016
Teaching Assistant, Labor Market Economics; Principles of Microeconomics, <i>Bilkent University</i>	2015-2017

## PROJECTS AND WORK EXPERIENCE

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Graduate Research Assistant (S. Nageeb Ali), <i>Penn State</i>	2022-2023
Alfred Galichon's 'math+econ+code' Masterclass on optimal transport and applications	2022
Graduate Research Assistant (S. Nageeb Ali and Keisuke Hirano), <i>Penn State</i>	Summer 2021

## HONORS AND AWARDS

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High Honor and Honor list, <i>Bilkent University</i>	2010-2015
Comprehensive Scholarship, <i>Bilkent University</i>	2010-2015

## PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

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Organizer, Theory Pre-Seminar Series, <i>Penn State</i>	2021-2022
Organizer, Theory Reading Group, <i>Penn State</i>	2021
Co-organizer, Women's Workshop, <i>Penn State</i>	2019
Organizer, Theory Reading Group, <i>Bilkent University</i>	2016
Referee for International Journal of Game Theory, WINE Conference	

## OTHER

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**Languages:** Turkish (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate)  
**Programming:** Matlab, Mathematica, Python, R, Stata, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X

## REFERENCES

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